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I. INTRODUCTION
EGISLATIVE changes dominate this year's survey. The 74th
Texas Legislature not only adopted a comprehensive Texas Bank-
ing Act of 1995, but also made substantial changes to Articles 3
and 4 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code. A voter initiative also
passed in 1995, affecting the manner and methods by which lenders can
obtain liens on homesteads. Finally, a recent opinion of the Texas Con-
sumer Credit Commissioner may impact the willingness of lenders to en-
gage in erstwhile home equity lending in Texas.
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II. THE TEXAS BANKING ACT OF 1995
The Texas Banking Act of 19951 is the work product of the Texas Bank-
ing Code Revision Task Force (the "Task Force"), a group of volunteer
practicing attorneys and staff members from the Texas Department of
Banking (the "Banking Department"). The Task Force was formed in
late 1993 with the purpose of reviewing and rewriting the then existing
body of law regulating state banks in Texas.
2
Subsequently, the Texas Banking Act was enacted by the 74th Texas
Legislature and became effective on September 1, 1995. The Banking
Act repealed almost in its entirety the preceding Banking Code, which
had been in effect since 1943. 3 In setting out to draft a new complete
body of law to govern and regulate the business of banking, the Texas
Legislature's main, general objective was to modernize and reorganize in
a more complete and coherent manner the law governing the business of
banking for state-chartered institutions.
The Task Force, in its work, was guided by four principles: first, to
promote the dual banking system of state and nationally-chartered banks
by making the former as attractive as, or more attractive than, the latter
form of chartering; second, to preserve and enhance the competitive par-
ity of banks and other forms of financial institutions; third, to reduce the
regulatory burden on state-chartered banks; and fourth, to provide flexi-
bility to banking institutions for the ease of adaptability to potential mar-
ket changes ensuing in the future.4
This section of the article does not attempt to discuss every aspect of
the new Banking Act. It will cover only three important areas of the new
Act: corporate governance, constitutional parity, and discovery of cus-
tomer records and examination reports. The discussion is limited to an
analysis of these specific areas of the new legislation to highlight the ad-
vantages posed to practitioners. The analysis is followed by examples
that may help in clarifying the modifications and understanding their
advantages.
1. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-1.001 through 342-9.015 (Vernon Supp. 1996)
(commonly known as the "Banking Act" [hereinafter Banking Act]). Some sections of the
Banking Act are applicable to both state and national banks while others are only applica-
ble to state banks and bank holding companies.
2. Unless otherwise specifically identified in this article, the terms "bank" and
"banks" refer to state-chartered institutions organized under Chapter 3 of the Banking
Act; the term "national bank" refers to a banking association organized under 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 21 (West 1989 & Supp. 1995); and the term "banking" refers to the performance of de-
pository institution functions of accepting deposits, discounting loans and related activities.
3. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 342-101 through 342-1011 (Vernon 1973 & Supp.
1995) (commonly known as the "Texas Banking Code of 1943" [hereinafter Banking
Code]).
4. Everett Jobe, Expanded Rule-Making Authority Will Benefit Texas Banks, TEXAS




An important area that the new legislation addresses is the corporate
governance of banks. The Banking Act incorporates the Texas Business
Corporation Act 5 and the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act 6
(the "Corporation Acts").
It was clear that the Texas Business Corporation Act did not apply to
banks, 7 and since the banking statute did not contain a full range of cor-
porate provisions, the gaps could be very troublesome. Now, the adop-
tion of the Corporation Acts into the new Banking Act will bring both of
these bodies of law together, so that state banks, in managing their orga-
nizational and shareholders' affairs, can employ the flexibility granted by
modern corporate law in Texas. Specifically, section 3.007 of the Banking
Act incorporates the Corporation Acts and states that these acts apply to
state banks to the extent that they are not inconsistent with proper bank-
ing practice, in which case the Finance Commission can adopt rules to
modify or adapt such bodies of law to make them compatible with the
Banking Act.8 This modernization of banking law primarily affects three
main areas of corporate governance: merger powers, shareholder rights
and flexibility in capital.
1. Merger Powers
Section 3.301 of the Banking Act grants a bank the power to merge
with any other entity that has legal authority to participate in a merger
transaction. A merger can be easily structured and consummated by fol-
lowing the procedures outlined in the TBCA for the merger of a domestic
corporation and a foreign entity.9 This new merger provision represents
a substantial change from the Banking Code, which allowed a state bank
to merge only with other state and national banks or savings and loan
associations. 10 The Banking Act still requires prior approval by the Texas
Banking Commissioner of a plan of merger when any surviving, new or
acquiring entity that is a party or is created by the merger is a state bank
or is not a financial institution." Additionally, a bank must comply with
any requirements regarding merger transactions imposed by the federal
agency having primary regulatory responsibility over the institution.' 2 In
5. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. arts. 1.01-12.54 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1996) [hereinaf-
ter TBCA).
6. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302, § 1.01-7.07 (Vernon 1973 & Supp. 1996).
7. For historic background, see Robertson v. State ex reL Clements, 406 S.W.2d 90,
93-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where the court held that the
TBCA did not apply to banks. See also TBCA art. 2.01 § 13(4)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
8. Banking Act § 3.007.
9. Id. § 3.301.
10. Banking Code § 342-308.
11. See id.; Banking Act § 3.301.
12. See the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 ("FDIA") 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-35
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995) (commonly known as the "Bank Merger Act"). Section 1828(c)
of the FDIA requires prior written approval of the responsible regulatory agency for any
merger or consolidation of a bank or savings association insured under the FDIA with, and
[Vol. 49
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general, the procedures for mergers contained in the TBCA are as mod-
em and flexible as any in the United States. The benefits of these merger
procedures are now available to banks subject to regulation by the Bank-
ing Act.
Two examples will serve to demonstrate how financial institutions in-
terested in modifying their corporate structure or acquiring assets can
benefit from the Banking Act.
Example A:
In the past, a bank interested in eliminating its holding company usu-
ally had to follow a series of elaborate steps to achieve its intended objec-
tive. This resulted in delay and additional transactional and legal fees.
Specifically, a bank intending to eliminate its holding company without
incurring any tax liability had to adhere to the following procedure: first,
incorporate an entity as a subsidiary of the bank itself; second, merge the
holding company into the newly created subsidiary; and finally, dissolve
the subsidiary. 13 If this three-step procedure was employed, tax-free re-
organization provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 14 were satisfied,
and the elimination of the holding company could be accomplished tax-
free.
Under the Banking Act, a bank interested in dissolving its holding
company can do so by merely merging the company into the bank, with
the bank being the surviving entity.' 5 So long as the merger satisfies the
relevant Internal Revenue Code provisions, it would likewise be tax-
free.' 6
Example B:
Under prior law, a bank interested in taking over an operating corpora-
tion had to acquire the target company as a subsidiary, since the Banking
Code did not permit a merger between a bank and a nonbank institu-
tion.' 7 This type of transaction often triggered a tax liability for the sell-
ing entity, which in turn could increase the total acquisition cost to the
bank.
Presently, under the new merger provisions of the Banking Act, a bank
intending to acquire a corporation engaged in an approved activity may
do so without triggering major tax consequences by merging the target
corporation with and into the acquiring bank itself.' 8 So long as the bank
correctly structures the transaction according to the applicable merger
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the acquisition can be consum-
into, any bank or institution which is not insured under the FDIA. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(West 1989 & Supp. 1995).
13. Jo Waller, The Texas Banking Act Part VIII, BANKERS DIG., Dec. 4, 1995, at 3.
14. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Of course, the holding company
could not be engaged in any activities that are not permissible for the bank.
15. See Banking Act §§ 3.301-.303.
16. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) (1988).
17. Banking Code §§ 342-308, 342-309.
18. Banking Act §§ 3.301-.303; I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
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mated without triggering a tax liability to either entity.19
In summary, these two examples demonstrate the simplicity and effi-
ciency with which a bank merger or other restructuring objective can be
accomplished under the TBCA, as adopted by the Banking Act.
Section 3.302 of the Banking Act establishes the criteria upon which
the Banking Commissioner evaluates a proposed merger transaction, as
well as the steps the Banking Commissioner will follow to grant the ap-
proval and notify the parties of the final decision. The applicant must
establish that the surviving entity will be solvent and have adequate capi-
talization in the future; will have complied with the laws of Texas; will
have discharged, assumed or maintained all deposit and other liabilities;
and will be in the business of banking only if it is a depository institution,
and if such, in no other business. 20
2. Shareholder Rights
The second area of corporate governance affected by the Banking
Act's importation of the Corporation Acts is in the area of shareholder
rights. Two important changes affect preemptive rights and cumulative
voting.
By adopting the TBCA, the Banking Act now grants a bank flexibility
to modify or completely eliminate preemptive rights to acquire shares of
newly issued stock.21 Prior to enactment of the Banking Act, preemptive
rights were automatically established as part of a bank's articles of associ-
ation and could not be waived or modified even by the unanimous vote of
shareholders.22 As in the old Banking Code provision, the Banking Act
provides that when the articles of association do not expressly limit or
deny preemptive rights, they shall be deemed granted.23
By permitting the limitation or denial of preemptive rights the new
provision carries the substantial advantage that banks can now be author-
ized-by shareholder amendment of the articles of association-to issue
new shares of stock without first having to offer it to existing
shareholders.24
Under Texas corporate law, amending the article to limit or deny pre-
emptive rights requires a board resolution and an affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the shareholders.25 Once the internal procedures are com-
plied with, the bank must file an executed original and one copy of the
statement of action for approval with the Banking Commissioner, who
during a period of thirty-one days after the filing date may accept or re-
19. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
20. Banking Act § 3.302(b)(1)-(b)(6).
21. Any issues arising under this topic related to federal or state securities laws are
beyond the scope of this article.
22. Banking Act § 3.002(6) (amending Banking Code §§ 342-301, 342-302, 342-304).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See idL § 3.101(b); TBCA art. 4.02 § A(1).
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ject the amendment. 26 Upon approval by the Banking Commissioner or
lapse of the statutory period granted for rejection, the Commissioner
shall return a certified copy of the approved amendment to the bank.27
Denying preemptive rights enables a bank and its shareholders greater
flexibility to issue new shares of stock without having to engage in the
process of offering the new stock to all present stockholders. For exam-
ple, two situations in which this flexibility is useful include the following:
(1) when a bank wants to enhance management compensation benefits by
offering its stock or stock options to its managerial employees; or (2)
when a bank intends to raise capital from a small number of wealthy and
sophisticated potential shareholders by issuing new equity securities. Ad-
ditionally, a waiver or limitation of shareholders' preemptive rights is use-
ful to a bank planning a transaction involving a stock swap or exchange to
acquire another entity or assets from another party. In this last scenario,
a bank could issue new shares of its capital stock to the seller without
having to offer a pro rata share of the new stock issue to all existing
shareholders.
Equally revolutionary in the banking context is the legitimation of cu-
mulative voting. Unlike preemptive rights which exist unless denied in
the articles of association, cumulative voting rights do not exist unless
granted in the articles. This amendment to the articles of association of
existing banks would be required to establish cumulative voting.
Of course cumulative voting rights are protective of the interests of
minority or small shareholders. In a bank with five directors it assures
that a person with one share more than sixteen and two-thirds of the
shares can elect one director.28
3. Capital Flexibility Including Blank Check Powers
A third aspect of corporate governance newly sanctioned by the Bank-
ing Act creates flexibility in capital planning. For the first time banks are
permitted to have authorized, but unissued shares. The Banking Act also
provides that a bank's articles of association may allow a bank's board of
directors to establish a series of stock shares, as well as determine by
resolution, the preferences, limitations and relative rights of shareholders
of each series.29 This is sometimes known as "blank check" powers. The
Banking Act states that the bank must comply with the procedures estab-
lished in the TBCA for establishing a new series of stock and determining
the preferences and relative rights of each series.30 Of course, the articles
of association, as approved by the shareholders, must permit such corpo-
26. Banking Act § 3.101(d).
27. It.
28. The formula for determining how many shares are needed to elect a given number
of directors is: [(number of shares voting) x (number of directors you want to elect) +(number of directors to be elected) +1] +1.
29. Banking Act §§ 3.101-3.102(a).
30. Id. § 3.102(b); TBCA art. 2.13.
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rate action.31 Once the decision to establish a new series of stock has
been adopted by board resolution, a statement of action outlining the
plan for the establishment of the series of shares must be filed with the
Banking Commissioner.32 This flexibility provided by latent capital plan-
ning has been available for many years to companies organized under the
TBCA and now banks can also take advantage of this authority.33
The Banking Act requires approval by the Banking Commissioner
before the issuance of a new series and before any increase or decrease of
the outstanding capital and surplus of a bank.34 Section 3.103(b), how-
ever, provides various exemptions to this approval requirement including
for the issuance of shares for cash, stock dividends, and transfers of prof-
its to capital or surplus by resolution.35
In conclusion, by adopting the TBCA, the Banking Act has drastically
overhauled the options and procedures available to bank shareholders
and boards of directors for designing and executing corporate govern-
ance. To what extent banks will employ these new provisions depends on
the receptivity and initiative of the board of directors, shareholders and
counsel of each individual bank. Evidence of the fact that banks are al-
ready taking advantage of these procedures is clearly shown by requests
already received by the Banking Department for various alternative pro-
cedures premised on the TBCA. For instance, the Banking Department
has issued an opinion which permits a bank holding company to acquire
the shares of a state bank by means of a plan of exchange, 36 so long as all
the formalities established in the TBCA for this type of transaction are
followed. 37 Overall, adoption of the Corporation Acts by the Banking
Act provides great opportunities to banks interested in conducting their
corporate affairs in a more liberal manner, similar to business corpora-
tions. The resulting flexibility and convenience of this adoption should
simplify and expedite the execution of corporate plans for banks.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL PARITY OF AcrIvrrIES
Since 1986, state banks interested in engaging in activities not expressly
permitted by either the Texas Legislature or the Banking Department,
but sanctioned for national banks, have relied on the parity provision es-
tablished in the Texas Constitution. Section 16(c), Article XVI of the
Texas Constitution 38 provides that state banks shall have the same rights
and privileges that are granted to national banks domiciled in Texas.39
31. Banking Act § 3.102(a).
32. Id. § 3.102(b).
33. Of course, the articles of association of an existing bank must be amended to so
provide. TBCA arts. 4.01, 4.07.
34. Banking Act §§ 3.102(b), 3.103(a).
35. Id. § 3.103(b).
36. Op. Tex. Gen. Couns. No. 95-32 (Sept. 6, 1995).
37. See TBCA arts 5.02-.07.
38. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 16(c).
39. The FDIA contains an interlocking parity provision which prohibits an insured
state bank from engaging as principal in any type of activity that is not permissible for
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Unfortunately, in the past there has not been much guidance as to the
process of implementing this authority.
The Banking Act establishes operational procedures for invoking the
constitutional parity provision. Subsections 3.010(b) through (f) now pro-
vide in great detail the requirements to be met before a bank interested
in gaining approval from the Banking Commissioner may exercise rights
or privileges granted to national banks.40 The bank must submit a letter
to the Banking Commissioner describing in detail the intended activity. 41
The bank must also furnish evidence of the authority of national banks to
engage in that same activity.42 During the thirty (30) days subsequent to
the filing of the letter, the Banking Commissioner may require up to an
additional thirty (30) days for analysis of the request or may prohibit the
bank from engaging in the activity at any time in the future.43 The Bank-
ing Commissioner may deny the approval to engage in such activity only
if it finds that a national bank domiciled in Texas is not entitled to engage
in the intended activity at issue, or where permission to engage in the
activity will negatively impact the safety and soundness of the bank. 4 If
the Banking Commissioner does not prohibit the activity during the stat-
utorily prescribed period, the bank will be deemed permitted to engage in
the proposed activity. 45 The benefit of having the Banking Act drafted
with such great specificity is that it provides a self-enabling framework in
which state banks can expeditiously solicit and receive approval to en-
gage in a contemplated activity or challenge an adverse decision by the
Banking Commissioner.46
To assure proper implementation of this parity provision, the Banking
Act contains specific language authorizing the Finance Commission to
adopt rules that implement the manner in which a bank may exercise
specific rights granted under this section.47 This operational provision is
in response to a case that held that the Finance Commission was not em-
powered to promulgate rules which did not follow from specific statutory
enactments.48
national banks, unless its primary regulatory agency determines that the activity does not
pose a significant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund and the applicant contin-
ues to be in compliance with applicable capital requirements. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831(a) (West
1989 & Supp. 1995). See also the FDIC Rules and Regulations relating to authorized activ-
ities for insured state banks. 12 C.F.R. § 362.4.
40. Banking Act § 3.010(b)-(f).
41. Id. § 3.010(b).
42. Although there is no list of permissible activities, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") has published a proposed rule which lists activities that the OCC
considers permissible and eligible for operating subsidiaries in gaining expedited approval.
See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,034 (1994).
43. Banking Act § 3.010(c).
44. Id. § 3.010(e).
45. Id. § 3.010(b).
46. See Gail Randall, A Czar is Born, TEXAs LAw., Jan. 16, 1995, at 3-6.
47. Banking Act § 3.010(e).




C. DISCOVERY OF BANK RECORDS AND REPORTS OF EXAMINATION
Another important area addressed by the Banking Act is the discovery
of bank records. The Banking Code established a procedure by which a
party could obtain information from a bank and provided a means by
which a customer could oppose a request for the discovery of his bank
records. Provisions covering civil discovery of a bank customer's records
are now codified in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.49 Addition-
ally, the new legislation sets forth the procedures to be followed by a
bank customer to challenge the release of records by filing a motion to
quash or a motion for a protective order.50
Section 30.007 recognizes that the subpoena order or request for dis-
covery of financial records may come from arbitrators or government
agencies as well as courts. The discovering party has to serve the bank
with the request at least twenty-four days prior to the date the informa-
tion is required. In addition, they must pay the bank or post a bond for
the total amount of the reasonable cost for the bank to comply with the
request, including attorney fees.51 When the customer whose records are
being discovered is not a party to the proceeding in which the discovery
order was issued, the discovering party must give notice of the proceeding
to the customer whose records are being disclosed of his right to prevent
disclosure by the bank and request the customer's authorization for bank
compliance with the demand.52
The codification makes it clear that it does not create a right of privacy
in customer records held by a bank.5 3 Section 30.007 is not applicable to
bank regulators, nor to a request for records as part of a criminal case.54
Courts and the commentators concluded that, notwithstanding the
existence of article 342-705, a bank is not prohibited from voluntarily pro-
ducing customer records. In Texas, courts have responded to claims that
a bank has violated its obligation to not disclose customer records under
article 342-705 of the Banking Code by denying such claims. In Pelt v.
State Board of Insurance, the court held that, "under article 342-705 §1 of
the Banking Code, a financial institution cannot be required to produce a
customer's records, except as therein provided, although it is not forbid-
den from doing so voluntarily. '55 Commentators have also argued that
49, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §30.007 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 30.007(c)(1), (3).
52. Id. § 30.007(d).
53. The Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401-3422 (West 1980
& Supp. 1984) (hereinafter "RFPA"), is a federal statute that establishes that financial
institutions are prohibited from divulging financial records of any customer of the institu-
tion to a federal authority in criminal proceedings, except by following the procedures
outlined in RFPA. Some of the limitations of RFPA, however, are that it does not apply to
discovery by state and local governments, to summons by the Internal Revenue Service nor
to reports prepared by regulatory agencies while in the process of conducting an examina-
tion of a financial institution.
54. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.007(d) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
55. 802 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
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article 342-705 does not prohibit voluntary disclosure by a bank of cus-
tomer records, since it is only a procedural provision.5 6 The new civil
practice and remedies code provision explicitly remove voluntary disclo-
sures from the strictures of the code.
Although different in nature, another important provision is section
8.011 of the Banking Act. This section covers the discovery of work pa-
pers and reports prepared for or created by a compliance review commit-
tee of a depository institution, including both national and state banks, or
their affiliates. 57 Section 8.011 provides that compliance review docu-
ments are not discoverable or admissible into evidence in a civil case,
even where the document may have been previously disclosed to a gov-
ernment agency.58 This protection also extends to any request for a com-
mittee member to testify as to the statements, discussions or decisions
made during a meeting of the compliance review committee or included
in a document revised by a member of such committee acting pursuant to
responsibilities as such.59 The purpose of this protection is to encourage
banks to investigate their own operational activities and to monitor com-
pliance with regulatory requirements and the banks own policies as well
as safe, sound and fair lending practices. 60 Obviously, bank regulators
are exempted from this prophylactic rule.
The Banking Act also addresses the disclosure of the reports of exami-
nation and other confidential information. Section 2.104 of the Banking
Act6' provides that a financial institution, affiliate or service provider that
receives confidential information (e.g., report of examination) from the
Banking Department may not disclose that information to anyone who is
not officially connected to the recipient, except as authorized by rules
adopted under the Banking Act. The Finance Commission has adopted
rules concerning the confidentiality of information. 62 The rules provide
that a person "officially connected to a financial institution" includes its
holding company, officer, director, manager, attorney, auditor, independ-
ent auditor, employee, and a person reasonably designated as officially
connected with the financial institution by resolution duly adopted by the
institution's board of directors.63 The rules also provide that a financial
institution may disclose confidential information to a non-employee, such
as its agent, bonding company, or a prospective acquirer, only pursuant to
board resolution designating the person or entity as officially connected
56. Dan Nicewander, Financial Record Privacy-What Are and What Should Be the
Rights of the Customer of a Depository Institution, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 601, 603 (1985);
Risley, Compelling Production of Bank Records in Texas, 53 TEX. B.J. 272 (1990).
57. Banking Act § 8.011.
58. Id. § 8.011(c)(2).
59. Id.
60. Jo Waller, The Texas Banking Act Part III, BANKERS Dio., Oct. 30, 1985, at 3.
61. Banking Act § 2.104. A recent case has held that a financial institution may waive
its work product privileges as to all adversaries by disclosing documents prepared by its
counsel to regulatory agencies. See Frankford Trust Co. v. Advest, Inc., No. 93-CIV-329,
1995 WL 491300 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995).
62. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.111.
63. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.111(c).
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with the financial institution.64 Disclosure or use of information in viola-
tion of Section 2.104 is a punishable offense.65
Section 2.105 of the Banking Act 66 provides that discovery of confiden-
tial information pursuant to a subpoena from a person subject to the
Banking Act must comply with rules adopted under the Banking Act.
Section 2.105 also provides that the rules may restrict release to confiden-
tial information that is directly relevant to the legal dispute at issue and
the rules may require a court-issued protective order, in the form and
under the circumstances the rules specify, prior to release. 67 The Finance
Commission has adopted rules attendant to the discovery of confidential
information. 68 Pursuant to the rules, a financial institution that receives a
subpoena for the release of confidential information must promptly no-
tify the Banking Department of the request, provide the Banking Depart-
ment with a copy of the process and the requested documents or
information, and object by written motion or other means.69 Prior to the
release of confidential information, the financial institution also must file
and obtain a ruling on a motion for protective order and in camera
inspection.
III. REVISIONS TO CHAPTER 3 AND 4 OF THE TEXAS
BUSINESS & COMMERCE CODE
Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"UCC"), approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1990, were adopted by the Texas Legislature in
1995. These new amendments to the Texas Business and Commerce
Code (the "Code") became effective as of September 1, 1995.
A. CHAPTER 3-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The revisions to Chapter 3 of the Code are so comprehensive that the
revised chapter replaces the original version.70 The new chapter is in-
tended to clarify aspects of the old Chapter 3 that were left to interpreta-
tion, and to reflect changes brought about by new technology and
64. The Banking Act provides that a financial institution may not disclose confidential
information to a shareholder unless when acting in another capacity. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. Art. 342-2.108.
65. Banking Act § 2.104 provides that violation is punishable as an offense under Tex.
Penal Code § 37.10
66. Banking Act § 2.105. Certain recent cases have held that banks must produce ex-
amination reports when served with a third-party subpoena notwithstanding federal bank-
ing agency regulations providing that examination reports are the property of the agency
and are confidential. See In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 1995), petition for
cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3318 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1995) (No. 95-638).
67. Banking Act § 2.105.
68. See 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.111(f).
69. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 3.111(0(1). The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the primary regulator for national banks, has issued a similar rule. See 12 C.F.R. Part 4,
Subpart C.




modem practices. Many changes result in increased subjective elements
in critical issues. The following is a summary of the most significant
changes to Chapter 3.
1. Short Title
While minor in its practical importance, the change in the short title of
Chapter 3 reflects a change in the emphasis of Chapter 3.71 The old short
title, "Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper" has been
changed to "Uniform Commercial Code-Negotiable Instruments, '72 re-
flecting a narrowing in the emphasis of the chapter.
2. Subject Matter
New section 3.102 is derived in part from old section 3.103, but is ex-
plicit in stating what was implied only by its predecessor: Section 3.102
only applies to negotiable instruments, and does not apply to money, pay-
ment orders governed by Chapter 4A, or securities governed by Chapter
8.7 3 Subsection (c) is new, explicitly providing that Federal Reserve regu-
lations and operating circulars supersede inconsistent provisions of Chap-
ter 3 to the extent of the inconsistency.74
3. Definitions
Several important new definitions have been added to the section.
One particularly significant change is a change in the definition of "good
faith." The new section 3.103(a)(4) defines good faith as "honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. '75
The new language adds a more objective cast to the definition of good
faith, and is consistent with the definitions of "good faith" in Chapters 2,
2A, 4, and 4A of the Code. A new definition which activates a change in
emphasis in Chapters 3 and 4 is the definition of "ordinary care." The
definition addresses a specific operational problem and permits payment
of checks without examination of signature. 76
4. Negotiable Instruments
Section 3.104 is the centerpiece of Chapter 3 because it contains the
key definition of "negotiable instrument. '77 Important changes in Sec-
tion 3.104 include the addition of definitions for the previously undefined
terms "check," "cashier's check," "teller's check," and "traveler's
71. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.101 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter
TEX. UCC].
72. Id.
73. Id. § 3.102.
74. Id. § 3.102(c). Article 4 already recognized the importance of Federal Reserve
authority, giving them the effect of agreements varying terms. Id 4.103(b)(c).
75. TEX. UCC § 3.103 (emphasis added).
76. This may change the result in cases like McDowell v. Dallas Teachers Credit
Union, 772 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
77. TEX. UCC § 3.104.
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check."'78 Texas lawyers are already familiar with these definitions and
with the consequences because of the cases Guaranty Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Horseshoe Operating Co.79 and University Savings Ass'n v.
Intercontinental Consolidated Cos.80
5. Issue
New section 3.105 contains the definition of "issue." Issue means "the
first delivery of an instrument by the maker or drawer, whether to a
holder or nonholder, for the purpose of giving rights on the instrument to
any person."'81 This new definition adds the requirement that the deliv-
ery have the purpose of giving rights on the instrument. The section also
adds as a defense to enforcement of an instrument, the failure of a condi-
tion to or special purpose for the instrument to be fulfilled.8 2 This de-
fense adds to the rights of parties other than holders in due course.
6. Unconditional Promise or Order
A negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise to pay.
Section 3.106 specifically identifies all provisions which, if contained in an
instrument, will render the promise to pay conditional.8 3 A promise or
order is unconditional unless it states "(i) an express condition to pay-
ment, (ii) that the promise or order is subject to or governed by another
writing, or (iii) that rights or obligations with respect to the promise or
order are stated in another writing." s4 The section is explicit in stating
that "[a] reference to another writing does not of itself make a promise or
order conditional. '8 5 In a major departure from the previous version, the
new section 3.106 states that limitation of payment to a particular source
or fund does not make a promise conditional.s6
7 Identification of the Person to Whom an Instrument is Payable
Section 3.110(a) of the revised Code states that "[t]he person to whom
an instrument is initially payable is determined by the intent of the per-
son... signing as ... the issuer of the instrument. '8 7 This section makes
the determination subjective. This subjective element has no counterpart
in the old Code. Subsection (b) of section 3.110 is also new. It states that
"[i]f the signature of the issuer ... is made by automated means ... the
payee of the instrument is determined by the intent of the person who
78. Id. § 3.104(f)-(i).
79. 793 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. 1990).
80. 751 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989), affd 793 S.W.2d 652 (Tex.
1990).
81. TEx. UCC § 3.105(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
82. Id. § 3.105(b).
83. Id § 3.106.
84. Id. § 3.106(a).
85. Id.
86. TEX. UCC § 3.106(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
87. Id. § 3.110(a).
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supplied the name or identification of the payee, whether or not author-
ized to do SO. ''88 This is one of the provisions incorporated into the re-
vised Chapter 3 designed to reflect the increasing use of technology such
as automated signatures.
& Place of Payment
Section 3.111 is completely new to the Code and describes the place
where an instrument is payable. 89 If a place is stated in the instrument,
the place of payment is the place described. If no place is specified, "an
instrument is payable at the address of the drawee or maker stated in the
instrument. If no address is stated, the place of payment is the place of
business of the drawee or maker."90 In the previous version of Chapter 3,
there was no guidance for determining where an instrument was payable.
9. Interest
Section 3.112(a) states that "an instrument is not payable with interest;
and interest on an interest-bearing instrument is payable from the date of
the instrument" 91 unless otherwise stated in the instrument. This specific-
ity in dealing with interest-bearing instruments is a new addition to Chap-
ter 3. Such determination had been left to the interpretation of the courts
by the previous version of Chapter 3. Subsection (b) of section 3.112 is
also new, and makes it clear that variable interest rate instruments are
negotiable. 92 However, Comment 2 to section 3.112 makes it clear that
the section is only meant to clarify the term "interest," and not to validate
interest provisions that violate other laws.93
10. Date of an Instrument
Section 3.113(b) contains rules for determining the date of undated in-
struments. 94 The subsection states that the date of an undated instrument
"is the date of its issue or, in the case of an unissued instrument, the date
it first comes into possession of a holder."95 Section 3.114(b) of the prior
version of Chapter 3, which this section replaces, did not address undated
instruments but, rather, dealt only with those which were antedated or
postdated.
11. Incomplete Instruments
The rules for enforcement of incomplete instruments provided in new
section 3.115 extend well past the rules provided in the prior version of
88. Id.
89. Id. § 3.111.
90. Id.
91. TEX. UCC § 3.112(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
92. Id. § 3.112(b). The Texas Supreme Court had already reached this result.
Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1992).
93. TEX. UCC § 3.112 at cmt. 2.




that section.96 This section provides that "if an incomplete instrument is
an instrument under Section 3.104, it may be enforced according to its
terms if it is not completed, or according to its terms as augmented by
completion." 97 The previous version of section 3.115 only allowed en-
forcement of an incomplete instrument upon completion. Therefore, an
instrument no longer needs to be complete in order to be enforceable.
12. Joint and Several Liability; Contribution
Section 3.116 establishes the rule that two or more parties who sign in
the same capacity (as makers, drawers, acceptors, indorsers who indorse
as joint payees, or anomalous indorsers) are jointly and severally liable in
such capacity. 98 This section has no comparable counterpart in the old
Chapter 3. Section 3.118(5) of the prior version of Chapter 3 allowed for
joint and several liability only where the instrument specified two or
more people who sign as makers, acceptors, drawers, or indorsers. Thus,
joint and several liability is now automatic where two or more parties sign
in the same capacity whereas joint and several liability was previously
required to be expressly stated. In addition, the new section 3.116(c)
specifies that the "[d]ischarge of one party having joint and several liabil-
ity by a person entitled to enforce the instrument does not affect the
right" of other parties having joint and several liability from receiving
contribution from the discharged party.99
13. Statute of Limitations
Section 3.118 contains rules for determining the statute of limitations
for Chapter 3.100 There were no such limitations rules in the prior version
of Chapter 3 because statute of limitations questions were covered by
common law. The new section, however, sets out a variety of limitations
beginning with that for the enforcement of an obligation of a party to pay
a note payable at a definite time. Under section 3.118, such actions must
be commenced within six years after the due date of the instrument.10 1
This provision changes current Texas law which specifies that a person
must bring suit on a debt within four years of the date on which the cause
of action accrues. 10 2 This is only one conflict among many that the new
section creates.'0 3 The Committee added the following comment in an
attempt to avoid much of the conflict: "[w]ith respect to actions on in-
struments covered by this Act, the statute of limitations provisions of sec-
tion 3.118 should be interpreted to supersede, because of their
96. TEX. UCC § 3.115 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
97. Id. § 3.115(b).
98. Id. 3.116.
99. Id. § 3.116(c).
100. Id. § 3.118.
101. TEX. UCC § 3.118 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
102. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(3) (Vernon 1986).
103. See, e.g., TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004(a)(3), 16.065, 16.070
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1996).
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particularity, any conflicting statute of limitations of general applicability
under Texas law.' 10 4 In addition, the Committee added that
because of their particular nature, the statute of limitations provi-
sions of sections 16.035 and 16.036 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, relating to actions with respect to debts secured by
liens on real property, and section 51.003 of the Texas Property
Code, relating to actions to recover deficiencies after nonjudicial
foreclosures, should be interpreted to control, in appropriate circum-
stances, over the provisions of section 3.118.105
14. Transfer of Instruments; Rights Acquired by the Transfer
Section 3.203(b) has no counterpart in the prior version of Chapter 3.
This section is intended to provide a definition of the term "transfer.' 1 06
The section states that "lain instrument is transferred when it is delivered
by a person other than its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person
receiving delivery the right to enforce the instrument.' 107 The comments
to the section make it clear that principles of property law, independent
of Chapter 3, should be used to determine the ownership rights to instru-
ments. In the previous version of Chapter 3, the determination of when a
transfer occurred was left to interpretation. This new definition should
make it easier to determine when a transfer has occurred and, therefore,
when a party takes an instrument as a holder in due course.
15. Indorsement
The definition of "indorsement," provided in Section 3.204, is new to
Chapter 3 and is dependent upon the intent of the signer. The signature
must be made "for the purpose of (i) negotiating the instrument, (ii) re-
stricting payment of the instrument, or (iii) incurring indorser's liability
on the instrument.' 1 8 However, a signature is an indorsement unless
there are accompanying words that unambiguously indicate that the sig-
nature was made for a purpose other than an indorsement. 10 9 In the
prior version of Chapter 3, no subjective assessment of the indorser's in-
tent was necessary to determine whether an instrument was indorsed.
This new subjective standard could make it more difficult to determine
whether a signature is an indorsement were it not for the stipulation that
a signature constitutes an indorsement unless it specifically states that it is
not made for an indorsement.
16. Special, Blank, and Anomalous Indorsements
Section 3.205 adds the definition of an "anomalous indorsement." 0
104. TEX. UCC § 3.118 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
105. TEX. UCC 3.118 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
106. Id. § 3.203.
107. Id. § 3.203(a).
108. Id. § 3.204(a).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 3.205(d).
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Such an indorsement means "an indorsement made by a person who is
not the holder of the instrument." '111 The only effect of an anomalous
indorsement is to make the signor liable as an indorser to the instru-
ment.112 In addition, an anomalous indorsement does not affect how an
instrument may be negotiated.
17. Restrictive Indorsement
The effectiveness of certain kinds of restrictive indorsements is cur-
tailed in section 3.206 which states that "[a]n indorsement limiting pay-
ment to a particular person or otherwise prohibiting further transfer or
negotiation of the instrument is not effective to prevent further transfer
or negotiation of the instrument."'1 3 The prior version of section 3.206
only specified that restrictive indorsements did not prevent further nego-
tiation of an instrument but was silent as to the effect of a restriction
limiting payment to a particular person. In addition, the new section
3.206 adds a rule providing that conditions the right of an indorsee to
receive payment do not affect the right of such person to enforce the
instrument. 114 These new rules serve to increase the negotiability of in-
struments that contain restrictive indorsements.
18. The Person Entitled to Enforce an Instrument
Section 3.301 provides a new definition of the "person entitled to en-
force" an instrument. 115 Such a person is "(i) the holder of the instru-
ment, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights
of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is
entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3.309 or
3.418(d)." 116 Moreover, such a person may be someone who is not the
owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument.
This new definition serves to broaden the category of parties that may
have rights to enforce an instrument.
19. Holder in Due Course
The requirements for holder in due course status set forth in section
3.302 are expanded." 7 Subsection (g) also recognizes that section 3.302 is
sometimes superseded by other laws which limit or define the status of
111. Id.
112. TEX. UCC § 3.205 cmt. 3 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
113. Id. § 3.206(a).
114. Id. § 3.206(b).
115. Id. § 3.301.
116. Id.
117. TEX. UCC § 3.302 (Vernon Supp. 1996). In addition to the requirement that the
person possessing the instrument be a holder, it is also necessary that "the instrument
when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or




holder in due course for particular classes of transactions."18
20. Overdue Instruments
Section 3.304 sets down a hard and fast rule regarding the staleness of
checks by recognizing that a check becomes overdue 90 days after its
date. 119 This strict 90 day rule is in contrast to the prior rule in old sec-
tion 3.304(c)(3) which created a presumption that 30 days after its date, a
check becomes stale. 120 This change will provide certainty to the deter-
mination of whether a person who takes such an instrument is a holder in
due course.
21. Defenses and Claims in Recoupment
The familiar defense of failure of consideration has been replaced by a
new term "claims in recoupment.' 121 The term "claims in recoupment"
is intended to adopt the rule that the obligor may assert, only as an offset
to amounts owing on the instrument, claims arising out of the same trans-
action with the original payee.' 22 Texas practitioners are advised to look
to two Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals cases: FDIC v. Lattimore Land
Corp.123 and Frederick v. United States.124
22. Claims to an Instrument
New section 3.306 recognizes that persons taking an instrument not as
a holder in due course take subject to property or possessory rights in the
instrument or its proceeds. Holders in due course take free of such
claims to the instrument.
23. Proof of Signatures and Status as a Holder in Due Course
The only new concept contained in section 3.308 is the addition of bur-
den of proof rules in certain circumstances. 25 The rule adds the require-
ment that
[i]f an action to enforce the instrument is brought against a person as
the undisclosed principal of a person who signed the instrument as a
party to the instrument, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
that the defendant is liable on the instrument as a represented per-
son under Section 3.402(a). 126
118. Id. § 3.302(g). The prime example may be the so-called federal holder in due
course doctrine and other special treatments afforded the FDIC in its bulk acquisitions in
bank failure situations.
119. Id. § 3.304(a)(2).
120. Id.
121. TEX. UCC § 3.305 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
122. Id. cmt. 2 (STATE BAR COMMIEE COMMENTS).
123. 656 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1981).
124. 386 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1967).
125. TEX. UCC § 3.308 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
126. TEX. UCC § 3.308(a) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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This burden of proof requirement, which was not part of the previous
Chapter 3, ties to section 3.402(a) to permit an undisclosed principal to be
liable on an instrument even though not named thereon.
24. Enforcement of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Instruments
Section 3.309 broadens the coverage of Chapter 3 in terms of a person's
ability to enforce an instrument such person is not in possession of the
instrument. 127 The prior version of Chapter 3 only dealt with the situa-
tion where an instrument had been lost. The language in the new section
expands the application to situations where a person does not have pos-
session of an instrument regardless of the reason he no longer possesses
the instrument.
25. Accord and Satisfaction Through Use of an Instrument
Section 3.311 has no counterpart in old Chapter 3.128 The section sets
forth the requirements for enforcement of an accord and satisfaction
through use of a negotiable instrument and is designed to present "an
informal method of dispute resolution carried out by the use of a negotia-
ble instrument. ' 129 The section applies if a person against whom a claim
is brought proves: "(1) that person in good faith tendered an instrument
to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim; (2) the amount of the
claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute; and (3) the
claimant obtained payment of the instrument."' 130
Business organizations should carefully follow the strictures of section
3.311(c)(1) and provide a conspicuous notice to their customers regarding
the person, office or place to which communication concerning disputed
debts, including instruments tendered as full satisfaction must be sent.
The logical place for such notice would be invoices, billing statements or
other mailings to the organization's customers.
26. Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Cashier's Checks, Teller's Checks, or
Certified Checks
To go along with the new definitions of cashier's check, teller's check,
and certified check in section 3.104, section 3.312 adds new rules covering
situations where such instruments are lost, destroyed, or stolen.' 3 ' The
new rule sets out the following requirements that a claimant must meet in
order to recover payment of the amount of the missing instrument:
(i) the claimant is the drawer or payee of a certified check or the
remitter or payee of a cashier's or teller's check, (ii) the communica-
tion contains or is accompanied by a declaration of loss of the claim-
ant with respect to the check, (iii) the communication is received at a
127. Id. § 3.309.
128. Id. § 3.311.
129. Id. § 3.311 cmt. 1.
130. Id. § 3.311(a)(1)-(3).
131. TEX. UCC § 3.312 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
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time and in a manner affording the bank a reasonable time to act on
it before the check is paid, and (iv) the claimant provides reasonable
identification if requested by the obligated bank.132
27. Refusal to Pay a Cashier's Check, Teller's Check, or
Certified Check
Section 3.411133 is also new and provides that if an "obligator bank
wrongfully (i) refuses to pay a cashier's check or certified check, (ii) stops
payment of a teller's check, or (iii) refuses to pay a dishonored teller's
check," the person entitled to enforce the instrument is entitled to com-
pensation for his expenses resulting from the wrongful act as well as in-
terest lost due to nonpayment. 134
28. Liability of Parties
New section 3.401 creates a new exception to the well-known rule that
a person is not liable on an instrument unless he or she has signed it. If
an instrument is signed by an authorized agent, the principal is bound,
even if the principal's name does not appear on the instrument. Another
new rule with respect to signatures appears at section 3.402(c). If a repre-
sentative signs his or her name as drawer of a check without indication of
the representative status and the check is payable from an account of a
represented person identified on the check, the signee is not liable on the
check if the signature is authorized. This rule is counter to normal agency
principles and effectively overrules Griffin v. Ellinger.135
29. A Change Affecting Both Articles 3 and 4
Perhaps the most significant substantive change made in Chapters 3
and 4 is the introduction of the concept of comparative negligence. One
effect of this no doubt will be to lessen summary judgment opportunities
because of the inherent fact questions in comparative responsibility.
Nonetheless, this new concept appears in the important loss allocation
rules including section 3.404 (fictitious papers); section 3.405 (padded
payroll or dishonest employees); section 3.406 (negligent contribution to
material alteration or unauthorized signature) and section 4.406 (unau-
thorized payment). The Texas adoption also included a change of lan-
guage from the Uniform Official Text. The Uniform Official Text
provides that, if a person fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or tak-
ing an instrument, the other party may recover part of the loss if the fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributed to the loss. The
non-uniform amendment deletes the work "substantially."
132. Id. § 3.312(b).
133. Id. § 3.411.
134. Id. § 3.411(b).
135. 538 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1976).
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30. Transfer and Presentment Warranties
Transfer warranties and presentment warranties receive more extensive
treatment in the new code.' 36 The new provision now specify the mea-
sure of recovery,137 a 30 day time limit for notice of a claim 138 and a bar
against disclosure with respect to checks.' 39 These sections are examples
of the new code performing the tasks of clarification and specification.
31. Discharge of Indorsers and Accommodation Parties
Section 3.605 generally conforms to old section 3.606, however, the
new section states that, "[d]ischarge of the obligation of a party to pay an
instrument under Section 3.604 does not discharge the obligation of an
indorser or accommodation party having a right of recourse against the
discharged party.' 140 This language serves to eviscerate the express "res-
ervation of rights" concept provided for in the predecessor section and
allows a party who discharges an indorser or accommodation party to
maintain his or her rights against other parties without taking any further
action.
B. CHAPTER 4-BANK COLLECTIONS AND DEPOSITS
The revisions to Chapter 4 of the Code, which covers bank deposits and
collections, include some technical and organizational changes but few
substantive modifications. Overall, the revisions to Chapter 4 of the
Code attempt to modify the regulation of bank operations to reflect pres-
ent-day developments in banking and commerce. Four revisions deserve
specific attention.
1. Electronic Presentment
Under the Revised Code,' 41 banks may, by agreement, clearing house
rule, or Federal regulation, provide for electronic presentment, the deliv-
ery of instruments for collection purposes by transmitting an image of an
item or information describing the item. 142 This substitution of informa-
tion for the physical items is often referred to as "giving presentment
notice" and is employed by most banks in the collection process. 143 An
advantage of electronic presentment is that delivery of the actual piece of
136. Transfer warranties and presentment warranties are separated and each given a
separate section in the new code; transfer warranties at § 3.416 and presentment warranties
at § 3.417.
137. TEX. UCC §§ 3.416(b), 3.417(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
138. Id. §§ 3.416(c), 3.417(e).
139. Id.
140. TEX. UCC § 3.605(b) (Vernon Supp. 1996).
141. For practical purposes, references to the Texas Code as drafted prior to the adop-
tion of the 1995 amendments will be referred to as the "Prior Code" and references to the
Code after the adoption of the 1995 amendments will be referred to as the "Revised
Code."





paper to the payor bank for its collection is not required, therefore elimi-
nating an often unnecessary paper trail. This process of reducing the
paperwork actually transferred between institutions for the purpose of
collecting interbank balances is known as "truncation." Truncation
speeds the check collection process for all parties involved. 144
The Prior Code did not give any explicit authority to banks for, or ac-
knowledge the process of, giving presentment notice, as opposed to man-
ually transferring the original piece of paper evidencing the item, because
few or no electronic collection systems were established at the time the
Prior Code was enacted in 1967.145 Presently, most banks either have
electronic collection systems established in-house or subcontract with an
outside party to provide this service.
Overall, a relationship between two depositary institutions regarding
presentment notice by electronic transmission is governed by the terms of
a clearinghouse agreement entered into by the clearinghouse. 146 Surpris-
ingly, in the highly regulated banking industry, the supervising govern-
mental agencies do not extensively regulate the process of electronic
presentment of checks between banks for collection. The new Chapter 4
provisions acknowledge that most banks collect their account balances
employing electronic collection methods. 147 Thus, the Revised Code al-
lows the parties to independently establish the terms of their relationship,
and contains only one provision regulating this relationship. 48 This pro-
vision establishes that the act of presentment of an item for collection
under an agreement for electronic presentment is deemed to have oc-
curred when presentment notice is received by the payor bank. 149 The
balance of the terms governing the relationship between the institutions
will proceed from the clearinghouse agreement between the banks.
2. Encoding and Retention Warranties
The Revised Code includes a new section on encoding and retention
warranties applicable only to a party doing the encoding of a check or a
144. Id. As part of acknowledging present-day mechanical procedures for the process-
ing of checks in bulk, the Revised Code provides that a depositary bank which receives for
collection an unindorsed item automatically "becomes a holder of the item at the time it
receives the item for collection" if the customer was a holder at the time of delivery and
the bank satisfies the other applicable requirements for becoming a holder in due course.
Id. §§ 4.205, 3.302. Under the Prior Code, a depositary bank attempting to transfer an
unindorsed item for collection purposes was required to get the customer's indorsement
upon receipt of the item or to supply the indorsement of its customer itself. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 4.205 (Vernon 1987) [hereinafter "Prior Code"]. Under the Revised
Code, indorsement for the purpose of collecting an item is made immaterial. That is, for
collection purposes, the depositary bank does not have to obtain the customer's indorse-
ment or actually affix its own indorsement to the back of the item. The depositary bank
need only transfer the item to the payor or a collecting bank.
145. See generally, BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPOS-
ITS, COLLETONS AND CREDIT CARDS (Rev. ed. 1995).
146. Revised Code § 4.110(a).





party retaining an item under an agreement for electronic present-
ment.150 But when the party encoding or retaining an item is a customer
of a depository bank, the bank also makes the warranty to the other col-
lecting banks. 15' Under this section, a breaching party warrants to any
subsequent bank in the collection process, including the payor, that the
encoding of an item by magnetic ink character recognition was correct
and that the retention of an item complies with the terms of their elec-
tronic presentment agreement. A party to whom the warranties are
made and took the item in good faith may recover from the warrantor
any damages suffered from a breach. 52
3. Proper Charging of Customer's Account
A bank is entitled to charge an item against the account of a customer
when the item is "properly payable ... even though the charge creates an
overdraft". 153 For an item to be "properly payable" it must be (1) au-
thorized by the customer, and (2) in accordance with any agreement be-
tween the customer and the bank.' 54 The Revised Code further
establishes that a bank customer is not responsible for the amount of an
overdraft unless the customer signed the payment or benefited from the
proceeds of the item. 155 This new provision has the effect of protecting a
nonsigning customer of a joint checking account who did not benefit from
the proceeds of the withdrawal leading to the overdraft. This provision
echoes previous case law in Texas.156
Additionally, the Revised Code creates a "safe-harbor" for paying
postdated checks for payor banks.' 57 The new safe-harbor provision rec-
ognizes that most check collection systems are automated and do not al-
low for the verification of the date on the item presented for collection. 158
The new provision states that when a bank customer writes a postdated
check, a payor bank will not incur liability for paying the check prior to
the specified date on the item, so long as it is otherwise properly payable
and the customer has not given proper notice to the bank of the postdat-
ing.159 For the postdating notice to be effective, the customer must de-
liver the notice in such a manner as to provide the bank a "reasonable
opportunity to act on it before the bank takes any action with respect to
the check.' 160 The Revised Code provides that a customer wishing to
150. Prior Code § 4.205.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Prior Code § 4.401(a); Revised Code § 4.401(a).
154. Revised Code § 4.401(a).
155. Id. § 4.401(b).
156. See Williams v. Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust, 685 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. 1985), where the
Supreme Court of Texas held that a nondrawing cosigner of a joint checking account could
not be found liable for the balance of an overdraft on the account where the bank cus-
tomer had not authorized the item nor benefited from or ratified the transaction.






defer payment of a check may do so effectively by postdating the check
and notifying the payor bank of the postdating in time to permit the bank
to act on the notice.161 If the bank acts upon presentment of a postdated
check by paying the check after having received timely notice of the post-
dating, the bank will be held liable for any damages resulting from its
acts, including damages for dishonor of items subsequently presented for
collection. 162
4. Customer's Duty to Review Account Statements
The Revised Code has substantially modified the rights and duties of a
bank customer relating to reviewing account statements in a timely fash-
ion. 163 Three main areas have been specifically addressed.
First, the new provisions require that banks providing truncated state-
ments-account statements showing the opening and closing balances
and transactions affecting these, but not returning the actual items paid to
the customer-must provide sufficient information in the statements to
allow the customer to reasonably identify each item paid.' 64 To be
deemed as providing sufficient information, the bank must furnish to the
customer a statement showing a description of each item, by item
number, amount paid, and date of payment. Additionally, when the bank
delivers a truncated statement to its customer, the bank must provide in
the statement a means for the customer to communicate a request that
the bank furnish specific items paid by the bank or legible copies of these
items. 65
Second, a bank customer is required to exercise "reasonable prompt-
ness" in examining the statement and reporting to the bank any items
forged or altered.16 Notice to the bank of such occurrences should not
be delayed over 30 days if the customer is to preserve its rights against
the bank for improper payment. 67 The Prior Code granted only 14 days
for a customer to notify the bank of any unauthorized signature or altera-
tion before the customer was precluded from asserting such a claim.
Finally, when the customer fails to review and report any item showing
any inconsistencies evident in the statement, but the bank also contrib-
uted in causing any resulting loss by failing to exercise ordinary care in
paying the item, the loss is apportioned between the customer and the
bank on a comparative negligence basis.' 68 This comparative negligence
test for determining liability is a substantial change from the prior provi-
sion applying to situations where both the bank and the customer were at
161. Id.
162. Revised Code § 4.401(c).
163. Id. § 4.406.
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id. § 4.406(c), (d).
167. Revised Code § 4.406(c), (d). Note that these time frames are often modified in
deposit agreements.
168. Id. § 4.406(d), (e).
19961
SMU LAW REVIEW
fault, which allowed the customer to assert a valid claim for the total
amount of the loss against the bank for failure to exercise ordinary care in
paying an item in the face of an unauthorized signature or alteration. 169
In the event that the item is paid in bad faith, the bank will bear the full
extent of the loss. 170
IV. CASE LAW REVIEW
Because of the significant statutory changes that have occurred since
the last time this survey was written, it is not practical given the space
allocated, and a reader's attention, to recap every case decided since the
last survey which touches on a banking issue. Instead, discussed below in
some detail are certain significant cases.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE FREEZES
Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpfl7' clearly leads the survey list of
1995 banking cases. This long awaited case provides that an administra-
tive freeze of a debtor's depository account does not violate the auto-
matic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 172 In this case Strumpf
was both a borrower and a depositor at Citizens Bank. At the time he
initiated his bankruptcy proceeding he had funds on deposit in an ac-
count. Upon learning of his bankruptcy the bank froze the funds on de-
posit. The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, indicates that
the bank's temporary refusal to pay items presented was neither a taking
of possession of the debtor's property nor an exercising of control over it
within the framework of prohibited conduct of the automatic stay.173 The
Court carefully distinguished between the administrative freeze estab-
lished by the bank and an act of setoff, which is stayed by the filing of a
bankruptcy. 174 This distinction is interesting because immediately upon
placing the administrative hold on the account the bank filed a motion
seeking permission to exercise its right of setoff. 75
Of equal interest is the Court's disposition of the debtor's argument
that the administrative hold violated the automatic stay because it was an
act to obtain the possession of the property of the estate or to exercise
control over property of the estate. 76 By viewing the depository rela-
tionship as one of contract, as opposed to one where the bank has posses-
sion of the debtor's property (i.e. money), the Court is able to dismiss the
debtor's argument by saying ". . . if a bank account consisted of money
belonging to the depositor and held by the bank then a violation of
362(a)(3), i.e. an act to obtain possession of property of the estate or to
169. Prior Code § 4.406(c).
170. Revised Code § 4.406(e).
171. 116 S. Ct. 286 (1995).
172. See, 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
173. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. at 290.
174. Id. at 289.
175. Id. at 288.
176. Id. at 290, citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a)(3) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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exercise control over property of the estate" may have occurred. 177 The
Court categorized the depository relationship as "nothing more or less
than a promise to pay, from the bank to the depositor... and [the bank's]
temporary refusal to pay was neither a taking of the [debtor's] property
nor an exercise in control over it, but merely a refusal to perform its
promise." 178
This case is remarkable not only in the consumer setting, but in the
more important area of cash collateral contests. It will not take long for
most debtor's counsel to advise their clients to withdraw all funds on de-
posit at a bank that they have borrowed money from prior to filing a
petition in bankruptcy. It may be more difficult for the typical business,
particularly where their funds are sent to a lockbox, to cause those funds
to be withdrawn from a bank prior to bankruptcy. While prohibitions
against using cash collateral without an agreement from a lender already
exist under the Bankruptcy Code, it is not unusual for a debtor in posses-
sion to spend cash collateral before an order is entered authorizing its
use. The tool created by Strumpf will allow banks to place administrative
freezes on cash collateral. It is important to note that the Court did not
address the debtor's claim that he had been damaged by the bank's freeze
which covered more money than he owed the bank.179 This seems a clear
signal that no more than is owed should be frozen. The facts of the
Strumpf case indicate that it appears to make no difference whether the
funds subject to the administrative freeze are pre-petition funds or post-
petition funds. Strumpf filed for relief under Chapter 13 on January 25,
1991.180 The bank did not place the administrative hold on the account
until October 2, 1991.181 Thus the Court makes no distinction between
pre-petition debt and post petition property of the estate.
B. BFP's
Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc. 18 2 again highlights the importance of the Certifi-
cate of Title Act. 183 Sight drafts and automobile transactions are, and
continue to be, a fertile ground for fraud. Gallas illustrates that no mat-
ter how bona fide the purchase, only where that purchase results in the
transfer of a certificate of title does the purchaser become the owner.184
In this case, Heart Attack Autos ("Heart Attack") gave Car Biz, the
seller of an automobile, a three-day sight draft in return for a Ford Ex-
plorer. Car Biz delivered possession of the vehicle to Heart Attack and
began the process of transferring title to the vehicle. Heart Attack, a
dealer in automobiles, then sold the vehicle to Gallas (the plaintiff) for
177. Strumpf, 116 S.Ct. at 290.
178. Id.
179. Id at 289.
180. Id. at 288.
181. Id.
182. No. 05-94-01754-CV, 1995 WL 689567 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Nov. 8, 1995, no writ).
183. Certificate of Title Act, TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 501.001-.159 (Vernon 1996).
184. Gallas, 1995 WL 689567, at *3.
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$14,000. Heart Attack gave Gallas possession of the vehicle, but not a
certificate of title. Instead, Gallas filled out an Application for Title and
relied upon Heart Attack's representation that the title was in the process
of being issued. When Heart Attack's sight draft was returned unpaid,
Car Biz reported the vehicle stolen and never transferred title to Heart
Attack. Gallas was arrested for driving a stolen vehicle and later sued
seeking declaratory judgment as the owner of the vehicle, entitled to spe-
cific performance of the transfer of the title. While a jury awarded Gallas
the vehicle and directed Car Biz to convey title, on a Motion for Judg-
ment Notwithstanding Verdict, the trial court held that Car Biz was the
owner of the vehicle and ordered Gallas to deliver the vehicle to the
seller. Over the dissent of Judge J. Wright, the appeals court affirmed the
trial court. Since Heart Attack never acquired title it did not have and
could not pass good title to a bona fide purchaser. 185
C. ARBITRATION
Arbitration clauses continue to find their way into more and more
bank loan documents. Therefore, the bank practitioner should be aware
that the Texas General Arbitration Act, which is modelled after the Uni-
form Arbitration Act, has been moved from Article 224 to Chapter 171 of
the Civil Practice & Remedies Code. 186 In moving the statute the Legis-
lature made generally cosmetic changes to the statute. While arbitration
decisions are not published, the practitioner should be aware that the
courts continue to broadly interpret arbitration clauses, even though in
the banking context such clauses are generally the work product of the
bank's counsel and are written to allow the bank to seek judicial enforce-
ment of its rights, including judicial collection action, without waiving the
bank's right to later seek arbitration of any dispute that might arise if the
borrower asserts defenses and/or counterclaims. Such arbitration clauses
in bank documents come into play only where a lender has instituted col-
lection actions and the borrower brings a counterclaim. Contractual pro-
visions can then establish that a lender's right to arbitration is not waived
by seeking judicial action first. Thus, the adoption of such an arbitration
program should be carefully considered by banks and their counsel.
The Texas Supreme Court has recently recognized that mere delay
does not waive a right to arbitration. This is significant because in many
workout scenarios a borrower will assert counterclaims against a bank.
These counterclaims will be held in abeyance while the bank and bor-
rower negotiate. Where those efforts to amicably resolve their differ-
ences end in failure, a claim of waiver will often be made in an attempt to
prevent arbitration. In Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Marshall87 the Texas
Supreme Court makes clear that a party urging that delay represents a
waiver of a right to arbitrate, carries the burden of proof in establishing
185. Id.
186. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001-.023 (Vernon Supp. 1996).
187. 909 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1995).
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that any such delay results in prejudice.' 88 Where the delay is during a
workout effort it is going to be difficult for most borrowers to carry their
burden that the delay was prejudicial.
D. GUARANTIES
The impact of confirmation of a bankruptcy reorganization plan upon
the liability of a guarantor was addressed in Austin Hardwoods, Inc. v.
Vanden Berghe.189 Vanden Berghe was the guarantor of the obligations
of Frame Industries Suppliers, Inc. to Austin Hardwoods, Inc. Frame In-
dustries filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and had their Chapter 11 plan con-
firmed. The terms of the plan provided for a 50% payment of all
unsecured debt, through installment payments to be made over time.
Austin was the holder of an unsecured claim. The plan of reorganization
further contained the following clause:
8.01 SATISFACTION. All creditors and parties in interest who
have or assert Claims in any class shall, upon Confirmation of this
Plan, be deemed to have acknowledged that their respective Claims
are fully satisfied by the distribution. provided herein, each of which
Claims, whether known or unknown, scheduled or unscheduled, filed
or unfiled, asserted or assertable, is declared and shall be, for all pur-
poses, upon the entry of the Order confirming this Plan, satisfied in
full.' 90
The court held that the provisions of § 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which states "discharge of the debt of a debtor does not affect the liability
of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt"
applied, even though the plan provided that the debt was satisfied. 191
Thus the court confirmed that the satisfaction of Frame Industries' debt
through their plan of reorganization does not have the effect of relieving
the guarantor of any liability.192
E. D'OENCH, DUHME & CO
The scope of the requirement that agreements be in writing and con-
tained in the minutes of an institution in order to avoid the defense estab-
lished by D'Oench, Duhme' 93 are further illustrated by Bluebonnet
Savings Bank v. Jones Country, Inc.194 The case law requirements of
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. have been essentially embodied in a federal stat-
ute.195 As adopted by statute, however, the broad shield this defense has
provided the government in the past has been substantially tamed. Now
188. Id. at 898-99.
189. No. 08-94-0086-CV, 1995 WL 681232 (Tex. App.-El Paso, Nov. 16, 1995, no writ)
(not yet released for publication, subject to revision or withdrawal).
190. Id. at *3.
191. 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(e) (1996).
192. Austin, 1995 WL 681232, at *3.
193. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
194. 911 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1995, no writ).
195. See 12 U.S.C.A. 1823(e) (1995).
19961
SMU LAW REVIEW
an agreement is enforceable against the FDIC as receiver if it has either
been approved by the board or its loan committee.' 96
Under the facts of Bluebonnet, Jones Country (plaintiff) financed a bus
through Home Savings, which required the plaintiff to maintain insurance
on the bus. The insurance was financed by the savings and loan under a
separate note. When that note was initially executed, funds were wire
transferred to an insurance broker and an insurance certificate was is-
sued. At the end of the year, the underlying debt was refinanced and a
new note was executed. The savings and loan's records, however, did not
contain a certificate of insurance or a receipt from the insurance carrier
indicating the policy was renewed. During the second year, the bus was
involved in an accident and Jones Country was notified by their supposed
insurance carrier that no insurance policy existed on the bus. Jones
Country then contacted Home Savings and was assured that coverage ex-
isted. Accordingly, Jones Country continued to make payments on the
note which financed the insurance premiums. A suit was ultimately filed
against Jones Country who employed its own counsel to defend the law-
suit. The bus owner settled the case, and incurred not only settlement
charges, but attorneys' fees. Home Savings was declared insolvent, and
its assets were transferred to the FSLIC as receiver. 197
The issue is whether the documentary evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish the elements of the D'Oench, Duhme defense, i.e. was the agreement
to provide insurance sufficiently documented. The court treated the
D'Oench Duhme defense like a statute of frauds defense-since there
was some evidence of the written agreement, was it enough? The major-
ity found that the note memorialized an agreement that Home Savings
was to procure an insurance policy by transmitting the proceeds of the
loan to the insurance company. The dissent, viewing the same facts,
found only an agreement to loan money for the purpose of procuring
insurance and not an agreement to procure such insurance. The majority
stated that the "in writing" requirement of D'Oench, Duhme is subject to
analysis of what a "reasonably prudent bank examiner" would have con-
cluded constitutes a writing within the bank's file. The reading continues
a trend of narrowing the broad scope of the D'Oench, Duhme defense. 198
F. LIMITED BANKING ASSOCIATIONS
It appears that the efforts to create Texas limited banking associations
in order to prevent the double taxation of dividend income, has failed.
The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has issued a Private Letter Rul-
196. Bluebonnet, 911 S.W.2d at 873, 874.
197. The FSLIC is now the FDIC. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
198. See, e.g., Cadle Co., Inc. v. Wallach Concrete, Inc., 897 P.2d 1104 (N.M. 1995); F.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co v. FDIC, 45 F.3d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1995); John v. RTC, 39 F.3d 773(7th Cir. 1994); RTC v. Midwest Fed. Sav. Bank, 36 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 1993); Erba Fina v.
FDIC, 855 F. Supp. 9 (D. Mass 1994).
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ing' 99 indicating that a bank reorganized as a Texas limited banking asso-
ciation will not be classified as a partnership under section 7701(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code. The IRS relied in part upon an application
which the bank filed with Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation indicat-
ing that, as reorganized, it should be considered incorporated under
Texas law. As a result of this ruling, the IRS appears to have negated the
main benefit attendant to Texas limited banking associations.
V. TEXAS CONSUMER CREDIT COMMISSIONER'S OPINIONS
CONCERNING HOME EQUITY LENDING
The issue of home equity lending has been a lively topic in Texas since
1986. Congress' removal that year from the Internal Revenue Code of
the deduction for interest expense incurred on consumer debt, and the
creation of a deduction for interest expense incurred on "home equity
loans"200 has spurred the interest of both Texas lenders and consumers.
Texas is the only state which does not permit such qualifying home equity
loans.
The advent in 1986 of this provision in the Internal Revenue Code
prompted lenders in Texas to solicit the opinion of the Texas Consumer
Credit Commissioner concerning the availability of this type of lending in
Texas. The Commissioner issued a formal interpretive letter,20 1 finding
that a Texas lender who engages in "home equity lending" would be en-
gaging in an activity that is a per se violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act since the lien obtained would be unenforceable 202
according to the prohibition in the Texas Constitution against liens on
homesteads for purposes other than purchase money loans or liens in
favor of mechanics or materialmen who improve the homestead or for
taxes. 20 3 Interpretive Letter 86-6 understood that the Internal Revenue
Code requires a valid lien in order to support a deduction for interest
expense on a home equity loan, and since the lien would be invalid in
Texas under the provisions of the Texas Constitution, no tax deduction
would be available. 204 Finally, the Commissioner concluded that he could
find no provision in Texas that authorizes "home equity lending" under
subtitle 2 of the Texas Credit Code.205 The rationale of Interpretive Let-
ter 86-6 was that Chapters 3 and 4 of the Texas Credit Code, which au-
thorize installment lending in general, prohibit the taking of any interest
199. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-51-032 (Sept. 27, 1995).
200. The term "home equity loan" is a loan that meets the parameters of the Internal
Revenue Code set forth at 26 U.S.C.A. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (1995) which states that the
amount of debt shall not exceed the greater of the equity in the taxpayer's principal resi-
dence or $100,000. There is no limitation in the Internal Revenue Code on how the funds
are to be used.
201. Tex. Consumer Credit Comm'r Letter No. 86-6 (Dec. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Inter-
pretive Letter 86-6].
202. Id.
203. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.




in real property as collateral, and that Chapter 5, which authorizes loans
secured by inferior liens on residences, requires those liens to be valid.20 6
Congress later clarified the matter of whether the lien must be enforce-
able in order to support the deduction of interest expense for Federal
Income Tax purposes. The adoption of the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988 removes any doubt as to the necessity of an en-
forceable lien on a residence supporting an interest rate deduction on a
home equity loan.20 7 As a result, section 163(h)(4)(C) of the Internal
Revenue Code now provides:
Unenforceable security interests. Indebtedness shall not fail to be
treated as secured by any property solely because, under any applica-
ble State or local homestead or other debtor protection law in effect
on August 16, 1986, the security interest is ineffective or the enforce-
ability of the security interest is restricted.
The legislative history indicates that Congress had Texas in mind when
they passed the 1988 Act.
The bill provides that interest on a loan secured by a recorded
deed of trust, mortgage, or other security interest in a taxpayer's
principal or second residence, in a State such as Texas where such
security instrument will be rendered ineffective or the enforceability
of such instrument will be otherwise restricted by State and local
homestead or other debtor protection law such as the Texas home-
stead law, shall be treated as qualified residence interest, provided
that such interest is otherwise qualified residence interest.208
Changed circumstances have dictated a reexamination of these issues.
In two new interpretive letters,209the Consumer Credit Commissioner ex-
amines the underpinnings of Interpretive Letter 86-6.1.210
The new commissioner acknowledges the changes to the Internal Reve-
nue Code that clarifies the issue of the enforceability of the lien for fed-
eral income tax purposes. She further opines that her predecessor's
declarations in the areas of the Internal Revenue Code and the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act were beyond his statutory authority.211
The Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner's authority to issue opin-
ions is limited to matters arising under the Credit Code. 212 In recognizing
this limited authority and in withdrawing 86-6, the Commissioner does a
206. Id
207. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat.
3342 (1988).
208. S. REP. No. 100-445, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4515, 4561.
209. Tex. Consumer Credit Comm'r Letter No. 95-1 and 95-2 (Feb. 9, 1996) [hereinafter
Interpretive Letter 95-1 and 95-2, respectively].
210. Interestingly the General Counsel of the Texas Department of Banking has also
issued a letter saying that a bank does not violate any statute by accepting an unenforce-
able lien on a homestead in order to permit interest deductions by the borrower for income
tax purposes. Opinion 94-86.
211. "I find, however, that I do not have the authority to interpret the DTPA because
any interpretative authority ... is limited to Title 79." Interpretive Letter 95-1.
212. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2.02A(10) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
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great service to Texas lenders by lessening the chilling effect arising out of
Interpretive Letter 86-6. The suggestion that any loan secured by an in-
valid lien would be a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
justifiably chilled the interest of Texas lenders to test these waters. Re-
moving any direct precedential value from 86-6 may embolden some
Texas lenders to create products, with adequate disclosures to consumers
about the invalidity of the lien granted, providing Texas taxpayers the
same deduction for interest expense that taxpayers in other states enjoy.
However, the Commissioner indicated, in her Interpretive Ruling that
she still sees Chapter 5 as an impediment to this type of lending because
no other enabling statutes in this state authorizing this type of lending,
overlooks the more limited application of Chapter 5. Extensive usury
reform took place in Texas in 1981.213 The general 10% usury ceiling was
increased to a minimum of 18%.214 As a part of this general usury re-
form, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the Texas Credit Code were amended to
allow lenders to lend at either the old add-on interest rate maximums, or
any simple interest equivalent authorized by the 1981 general usury
reform.
In making these general interest rate reforms applicable to the Texas
Credit Code, the Legislature clarified the scope and application of the
Texas Credit Code. Curiously, nowhere in the original Texas Credit Code
were there limitations indicating that it was applicable only to consumer
lending. In enacting the general usury reform in 1981, the Legislature
narrowed the scope of Chapters 3, 4, and 5 and clearly indicated that
those provisions of the Texas Credit Code deal only with loans that are
extended primarily for personal, family, or household use.215
When Commissioner Endsley issued Interpretive Ruling 86-6, his con-
cern about finding an enabling statute authorizing a creditor to make a
loan secured by an unenforceable second lien on residential property fo-
cused on Chapter 5 of the Texas Credit Code where the purpose of the
loan was primarily personal, family, or household and where the loan is
repayable in substantial equal monthly installments.216 However, a loan
either for "investment" purposes or a loan for personal, family, or house-
213. Tex. H.B. 1228, § 5, 67th Leg., R.S. (Act approved May 8, 1981).
214. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(a), (b) (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
The maximum is now 24% (on loans in general, and a maximum of 28% on extensions of
credit in an amount in excess of $250,000).
215. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(n)(2) (Vernon 1987).
Any loan made under this Article that is extended primarily for personal
family, or household use but not for business, commercial, investment, agri-
cultural, or similar purposes, and that is predominantly payable in monthly
installments and is described by Section (1), Article 5.01, of this Title and Sec-
tions (1), (3), and (4), Article 5.02, of this Title and that is made, negotiated,
or arranged by a person engaged in the business of making, negotiating, or
arranging those types of loans, is subject to Chapter 5 of this Title, and any
person except a bank or savings and loan association engaged in that busi-
ness shall obtain a license under Chapter 3 of this Title.
Id. (Emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
216. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(n)(2) (Vernon 1987).
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hold purposes which is not repayable in substantial equal monthly install-
ments217 would not fall on Chapter 5 of the Texas Credit Code. It seems
clear now that chapter one might be used to validate the proposed
lending.
Commissioner's Interpretive Ruling 95-1 overturns an opinion that
both, because of changes in the law and an overly broad scope to begin
with, unfairly chilled Texas lenders' willingness to provide a vehicle which
would allow the citizens of the State of Texas to be treated on an equita-
ble basis with taxpayers in other states. Ruling 95-1, however, did not
fully appreciate the historical perspective from which the Texas Credit
Code arises, and wholly overlooked the clear language of the general
usury reform enacted in 1981 which limited the reach of Chapter 5 to a
narrow area as to recognize the general applicability of chapter one.
VI. PROPOSITION 4 AND ITS EFFECT UPON
TEXAS HOMESTEADS
In Interpretive Ruling 95-1, the Commissioner suggests that legislative
reform is needed to clarify the issue of home equity lending in Texas, not
action by her office. Proving that the Legislature can successfully act in
this area, Senate Joint Resolution 46 was passed in the last legislative
session as a proposed constitutional amendment dealing with oweltys of
partition on homesteads and federal tax liens which attach to homesteads.
On November 4, 1995, the proposition received sufficient voter approval
to become law.
Proposition 4 amended Article 16 section 50 of the Texas Constitution
to recognize the enforceability of a lien granted as part of an owelty of
partition and to permit the refinancing of a federal tax lien against a
homestead.2 18 The statutory change corresponding to the constitutional
amendment appears at section 41.001 of the Property Code.2 19
Proposition 4 was designed to clarify Texas case law and overrule the
holding of three seminal homestead cases. But it can also be seen as an
inroad into the sacrosanct belief that a lien against the homestead in
Texas should only be permitted for a purchase money lien or for liens in
favor of mechanics or materialmen who improve the homestead or for ad
valorem taxes.
The three modern homestead cases which Proposition 4 overrules are
as follows:
The case of In re J. R. Buffington2 o held that when two spouses who
own a homestead prior to a divorce, and as part of the divorce dissolution
of property one spouse conveys to the other his or her undivided one-half
interest and evidences that conveyance by an owelty deed of partition,
217. Interpretative Letter 81-34 indicates that the 1981 amendments effectively re-
moved the requirement that the monthly installments be substantially equal.
218. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
219. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1996).
220. 167 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994).
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utilizing either a vendor's and/or a contractual lien to secure the payment
of the sum to be received in return for that conveyance. 221 The selling
spouse's security interest extends only to the one-half undivided interest
in the former homestead which that spouse conveyed. 222 Upon a default
by the spouse who retains the homestead, the conveying spouse is enti-
tled to foreclose only upon the undivided one-half interest to which the
lien attached.223 While well reasoned and in harmony with the constitu-
tional concept that a purchase money lien can only attach to an interest
sold, such a holding provides for a rather anomalous result. Namely, the
selling spouse, after having foreclosed on the one-half interest pledged,
may then have to seek judicial intervention in the form of a partition
lawsuit requiring the sale of the home in order to receive the economic
benefit of the original bargain. By recognizing the unmarketable nature
of an undivided one-half interest in the most common form of community
real property (i.e., a house), this amendment to the Constitution allows a
lien on a Texas homestead to be valid even where that lien attaches to the
one-half interest was not sold.
A second case dramatically affected by Proposition 4 was Crowder v.
Benchmark Bank.224 The case was subsequently reversed by the Texas
Supreme Court.225 Thus, the statutory and case law are now consistent
that a party can succeed in a federal tax lien against Texas homestead
property.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 also overturned In Re Niland,22 6 a decision,
the minority opinion notes as providing an unduly harsh result to lenders
by making them the party harmed by declaring invalid a lien taken
against property that a defrauding owner worngfully claims is not his
homestead. As early as 1890 in Texas Land & Loan Co. v. Blalock, the
Texas Supreme Court has held that no estoppel can arise in favor of a
lender who has attempted to secure a lien on a homestead in actual use
and possession of the family, based on declarations of the husband and
wife made orally or in writing contrary to the fact.227 The court in Blalock
indicated that to hold otherwise would practically abrogate the Constitu-
tion.228 In re Niland was a modern reaffirmation of this approach.
Proposition 4 adopts a more modern approach that shifts the burden of
proof to the homestead claimant who must prove that the lender had
actual knowledge of the occupation of the property as their homestead, in
order to invalidate a lien given through the issuance of a false homestead
affidavit.229 Clearly the constitutional amendment reflects a movement,
221. Id at 836.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 889 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ granted).
225. 39 TEx. Sup. Cr. J. 361 (Mar. 7, 1996).
226. 825 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1987).
227. 76 Tex. 85, 89, 13 S.W. 12, 13 (1890) (emphasis added).
228. Idt
229. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 1987 &
Supp. 1996).
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however slight, from the absolute homestead exemption tradition in
Texas. By easing the mechanism of tapping the equity in homesteads,
Proposition 4 will prevent many future forced sales.
